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PROPORTIONALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HUMAN RIGHTS INTERPRETATION*
Imer B. FLO RES**
Re su men:
En este ar tícu lo el au tor, en un con tex to en el cual los prin ci pios y el
prin ci pio de pro por cio na li dad es tán en el co ra zón no so la men te de la fi lo -
so fía y teo ría del de re cho sino ade más de la in ter pre ta ción en ma te ria
cons ti tu cio nal y de de re chos hu ma nos, ar gu men ta que cuan do ha bía
quie nes es ta ban lis tos para le van tar la mano para de cla rar a un ga na dor 
uná ni me, al gu nos crí ti cos y es cép ti cos apa re cie ron. Au na do a las ob je -
cio nes tra di cio na les es tán preo cu pa dos por que en su opi nión el prin ci -
pio de pro por cio na li dad in vi ta a ha cer un ba lan ceo in ne ce sa rio en tre de -
re chos exis ten tes, a in ven tar nue vos de re chos de la nada (en de tri men to
de los ya bien es ta ble ci dos), y que al ha cer el ba lan ceo se pier dan de re -
chos. Para res pon der a ta les ob je cio nes y re cha zar las mis mas, así como
re for zar la im por tan cia del de sa rro llo, el au tor: pri me ro, re vi si ta la cons -
ti tu ción de los prin ci pios y del prin ci pio de pro por cio na li dad, la cual per
de fi ni tio con tra di ce cada una de las ob je cio nes; y, lue go, rees ta ble ce la
cons ti tu ción del prin ci pio de pro por cio na li dad como un prin ci pio de prin -
ci pios no sólo en la in ter pre ta ción en ma te rial cons ti tu cio nal y de de re -
chos hu ma nos sino tam bién en la le gis la ción, in clui da la re for ma cons ti -
tu cio nal, y en la ad ju di ca ción.
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PROBLEMA
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Pa la bras Cla ve:
           De re chos, in ter pre ta ción, prin ci pios, pro por cio na li dad.
Abstract:
In this ar ti cle the au thor, in a con text in which prin ci ples and the prin ci ple
of pro por tion al ity are at the heart not only of ju ris pru dence but also of con -
sti tu tional and hu man rights in ter pre ta tion, claims that when there were
those ready to raise the hand to de clare a unan i mous win ner, some crit ics
and skep tics ap peared. In ad di tion, to the tra di tional ob jec tions, they worry 
that pro por tion al ity in vites to do ing un nec es sary bal anc ing be tween ex ist -
ing rights, in vent ing new rights out of noth ing at all (in det ri ment of those
al ready well-es tab lished ones), and even worse in do ing so bal anc ing some 
rights away. In or der to an swer to such ob jec tions and to re ject them, as
well as to re in force the im por tance of this de vel op ment, the au thor: first, re -
vis its the con sti tu tion of prin ci ples and of the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity,
which per definitio con tra dicts each one of this ob jec tions; and, then, re -
states the con sti tu tion of the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity as a prin ci ple of
prin ci ples not only in con sti tu tional and hu man rights in ter pre ta tion but
also in leg is la tion, in clud ing con sti tu tional ref or ma tion, and ad ju di ca tion.
Key words:
                         In ter pre ta tion, Prin ci ples, Pro por tion al ity, Rights.
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[E]ye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.
Ex o dus 21: 24-5.
Haste still pays haste, and lei sure an swers lei sure;
Like doth quit like, and mea sure still for mea sure.
Wil liam SHAKESPEARE, Mea sure for Mea sure (1603).
Right in gen eral, may be de fined as the lim i ta tion of
the Free dom of any in di vid ual to the ex tent of its
agree ment with the free dom of all other in di vid u als,
in so far as this is pos si ble by a uni ver sal Law.
Im man uel KANT, On the Com mon Say ing. ‘This May
be True in The ory, But it Does not Ap ply in Prac tice’”
(1793).
All so cial pri mary goods —lib erty and op por tu nity,
in come and wealth, and the bases of self-re spect—
are to be dis trib uted equally un less an un equal dis -
tri bu tion of any or all of these goods is to the ad van -
tage of the least fa vored.
John RAWLS, A The ory of Jus tice, § 46 (1971).
SUMMARY: I. In tro duc tion. II. The Con sti tu tion of Prin ci ples
and of Pro por tion al ity. III. The Prin ci ple of Pro por -
tion al ity in Con sti tu tional and Hu man Rights In ter -
pre ta tion. IV. Con clu sion.
I. INTRO DUC TION
Con sti tut ing —and even re con sti tut ing— le gal prin ci ples, in 
gen eral, and the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity, in par tic u lar,
to the core of le gal stan dards and tests, of le gal anal y sis
and rea son ing, of le gal ra tio nal ity for short, are ma jor de -
vel op ments in con tem po rary not only ju ris pru dence but
also con sti tu tional and hu man rights in ter pre ta tion for the
past at least thirty-five years. These de vel op ments co in cide
with the ap pear ance of sev eral ar ti cles of Ron ald Dworkin
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in a co her ent and co he sive book, i.e. Tak ing Rights Se ri -
ously, which not only de fines and de fends a lib eral the ory
of law based on rights but also de bunks and dis places the
pre vail ing con cep tion of law as a model of rules and can be
char ac ter ized as a model of prin ci ples.1
And so, now a days, prin ci ples, in gen eral, and the prin ci -
ple of pro por tion al ity, in par tic u lar, not only ap pear to be
quint es sen tial for law but also seem to be ubiq ui tous: here,
there and ev ery where. De spite the dif fer ences in the na -
tional and re gional le gal sys tems, prin ci ples, es pe cially the
prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity, have tran scended the bor der -
lines of coun tries, at least within the West ern Le gal Tra di -
tion, in both Civil Law and Com mon Law fam i lies, and even 
have pro vided a means of rec on cil ing the grow ing global
con cerns to wards hu man rights pro tec tion with other im -
por tant lo cal con sid er ations in the pro cess not only of bal -
anc ing com pet ing rights but also of jus ti fy ing their lim i ta -
tions.2
More over, at a time, when prin ci ples and the so-called
pro por tion al ity test —or bal anc ing as it is also known—
were at the heart not only of ju ris pru dence but also of con -
sti tu tional and hu man rights in ter pre ta tion, and there were 
those ready to raise the hand to de clare an unan i mous win -
ner, some crit ics and skep tics ap peared —or even re ap -
peared.3 To the tra di tional ob jec tions re gard ing the in exist -
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1 Vid. Dworkin, Ron ald, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, Cam bridge, Mas sa -
chu setts: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1977 (there is 2nd ed. with “Re ply to
Crit ics”: 1978). (Here in af ter the ref er ences will be made to the re vised edi -
tion.) Vid. also Rawls, John, A The ory of Jus tice, Cam bridge, Mas sa chu -
setts: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1971 (there is a Re vised Edi tion: 1999.)
2 Vid. Alexy, Rob ert, A The ory of Con sti tu tional Rights, trans. Julian
Rivers, Ox ford, Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2002; Barak, Aharon, Pro por tion -
al ity: Con sti tu tional Rights and their Lim i ta tions, Cam bridge, Cam bridge
Uni ver sity Press, 2012; and Möller, Kai, The Global Model of Con sti tu tional 
Rights, Ox ford, Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2012.
3 Vid. for ex am ple, Webber, Grégoire C. N., The Ne go tia ble Con sti tu -
tion: On the Lim i ta tion of Rights, Cam bridge, Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press,
ence of prin ci ples, its plu ral ity, rel a tiv ity and sub jec tiv ity,
their in com pat i bil ity, incommensurability and in de ter mi -
nacy, es pe cially in cases of value con flict, and so on, some
now worry ad di tion ally that pro por tion al ity con sti tutes “a
dan ger ous and mis guided in vi ta tion” to do ing un nec es sary
bal anc ing be tween ex ist ing rights, in vent ing new rights out
of noth ing at all (in det ri ment of the al ready well-es tab -
lished ones), and —even worse— in do ing so bal anc ing
some rights away, such as hu man dig nity.4
Not with stand ing, to an swer to such ob jec tions and to re -
ject them, as well as to re in force the im por tance of this de -
vel op ment, I will like first to go back to the ba sics to re visit
the con sti tu tion of prin ci ples and of the prin ci ple of pro por -
tion al ity, which per definitio con tra dicts each one of this ob -
jec tions by prov ing them wrong, and then to take the claim
one step fur ther to re state the con sti tu tion of the prin ci ple
of pro por tion al ity as a prin ci ple of prin ci ples not only in
con sti tu tional and hu man rights in ter pre ta tion but also in
leg is la tion, in clud ing con sti tu tional ref or ma tion, and in ad -
ju di ca tion.
Ac cord ingly, in the com ing sec tion II, I in tend fol low ing
Dworkin to re visit the dis tinc tion be tween rules and prin ci -
ples to em pha size that the for mer are ab so lute and ap plied
in an all-or-noth ing fash ion, whereas the lat ter are not and
do have a di men sion of weight. Hence, rules are con nected
—or link to gether— in chains of va lid ity and are ap plied by
sub sum ing the (par tic u lar) fact into the one and only ap pli -
ca ble (gen eral) rule, whereas prin ci ples are in ter con nected
—or hang to gether— in a unity of value and are ap plied by
bal anc ing the dif fer ent prin ci ples at stake and so pro por -
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2009; and Tremblay, Luc B. and Webber, Grégoire C. N. (eds.), The Lim i ta -
tion of Char ter Rights: Crit i cal Es says on R. v Oakes, Montréal, Éditions
Thémis, 2009.
4 Vid. for this claim and its re sponse, Kumm, Mattias and Walen, Alec
D., “Hu man Dig nity and Pro por tion al ity: Deontic Plu ral ism in Bal anc ing”, 
in Huscroft, Grant et al. (eds.), Pro por tion al ity and the Rule of Law: Rights,
Jus ti fi ca tion, Rea son ing (forth com ing).
tion al ity as a prin ci ple pro vides a means to do such bal -
ance. Ac tu ally, as Rob ert Alexy has pointed out the na ture
of prin ci ples im plies the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity and
vice versa. Any way, de spite the o ret i cal and prac ti cal dis -
agree ment, pro por tion al ity has be come an es sen tial meth -
od olog i cal cri te rion in the in ter pre ta tion of con sti tu tional
and hu man rights.
In the con tin u ing sec tion III, I pre tend to ex plore not only 
the man ner in which the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity —lato
sensu, com pris ing three sub-prin ci ples 1) suit abil ity; 2) ne -
ces sity; and, 3) pro por tion al ity —strictu sensu, has been
con sti tuted and fur ther de vel oped by the in ter pre ta tion of
some of the na tional con sti tu tional courts and re gional hu -
man rights tri bu nals, in gen eral, but also the mode in
which the Mex i can Su preme Court, in par tic u lar, does ap -
ply —or some times fails to ap ply— the bal anc ing cri te rion.5
Ad di tion ally, the pro por tion al ity ap proach has proven to be
ex tremely use ful not only in con sti tu tional and hu man
rights in ter pre ta tion but also in ad ju di ca tion and leg is la -
tion, in clud ing con sti tu tional ref or ma tion, as a cri te rion
that must be met in or der to stand a chal lenge on its con -
sti tu tion al ity.
II. THE CONSTITUTION OF PRINCIPLES AND OF PROPORTIONALITY
The ap pear ance of Dworkin’s “The Model of Rules”6 in
1967 did con sti tute not only a gen eral at tack on le gal pos i -
tiv ism with H. L. A. Hart’s ver sion as its main tar get by ad -
dress ing the ques tion on whether law is a sys tem for rules
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5 By the by, in my opin ion, it is pre cisely when courts fail to ap ply the
pro por tion al ity test that rights fade away and not the other way around
when they do ap ply it.
6 Dworkin, Ron ald, “The Model of Rules I”, in Dworkin, Ron ald, Tak -
ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., pp. 14-45. (Orig i nally pub lished as “The Model of
Rules”, Uni ver sity of Chi cago Law Re view, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1967, pp. 14-46;
and re printed as “Is Law a Sys tem of Rules?”, in Sum mers, Rob ert S. (ed.), 
Es says in Le gal Phi los o phy, Ox ford, Ba sil Blackwell, 1968, pp. 25-60.)
but also an al ter na tive based in prin ci ples, in gen eral, and
rights, in par tic u lar. In short, he claimed that law was not
“a model of and for a sys tem of rules” and grounded his
claim around the fact that when law yers, le gal of fi cials and
le gal op er a tors “rea son or dis pute about le gal rights and
ob li ga tions, par tic u larly in those hard cases where our
prob lems with these con cepts seem most acute, they make
use of stan dards that do not func tion as rules, but op er ate
dif fer ently as prin ci ples, pol i cies, and other sorts of stan -
dards.”7
As it is widely ac knowl edged, he char ac ter ized le gal pos i -
tiv ism as “a model of and for a sys tem of rules” and pointed 
out “its cen tral no tion of a sin gle fun da men tal test for law
forces us to miss the im por tant roles of the stan dards that
are not rules.”8 In my opin ion, he crit i cized ex plic itly (1) the 
re duc tion of le gal stan dards to rules, de spite the ex is tence
of other le gal stan dards, such as prin ci ples, rights and pol i -
cies; and (2) the re duc tion of le gal tests to a sin gle fun da -
men tal test as so ci ated with rules, namely the va lid ity test,
which Dworkin la beled as ped i gree test,9 in spite of the ex -
is tence of other le gal tests, as so ci ated with other le gal stan -
dards. Sim i larly, I will like to sug gest that he also crit i cized
—at least im plic itly— (3) the re duc tion of le gal ra tio nal ity to 
a sin gle fun da men tal log i cal level, as so ci ated both with
rules and its va lid ity test, namely the an a lyt i cal or for mal
logic, which can be char ac ter ized ei ther as de duc tive, i.e.
from-the-gen eral-to-the-par tic u lar, or in duc tive, from-the
par tic u lar-to-the-gen eral, re gard less of the ex is tence of
other modes of le gal ra tio nal ity, as so ci ated with other le gal
stan dards and tests, namely the di a lec ti cal or in for mal/ma -
te rial logic, which is nei ther de duc tive nor in duc tive but ad -
duc tive and in ter pre tive.10
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7 Ibi dem, p. 22.
8 Idem.
9 Ibi dem, p. 17.
10 Vid. in fra note 41 and its ac com pa ny ing text.
Any way, let me start by re pro duc ing Dworkin’s seven-fold 
strat egy, in or der to ful fill his im me di ate pur pose of dis tin -
guish ing prin ci ples (ge ner i cally) from rules.
(1) He es tab lishes the use of the term “prin ci ple” —lato
sensu— “to re fer to the whole set of le gal stan dards other
than rules”.11 Ba si cally, fol low ing the prin ci ples of clas si cal
log i cal rea son ing (iden tity, non-con tra dic tion and ex cluded
mid dle —principium tertium exclusum or tertium non datur)
he claims: since a rule must be con stant and re main iden ti -
cal to it self to be truly so; since a rule can not at a same
time be or not-be; and, since the third mid dle op tion is ex -
cluded. There fore, re gard ing le gal stan dards, ei ther they are 
—and func tion as— le gal rules or not. In the last case, they 
are —and func tion as— le gal prin ci ples —lato sensu— in -
stead.
(2) He dis tin guishes be tween prin ci ples —strictu sensu—
and pol i cies; and, in so do ing, he fur ther stip u lates that
“pol icy” is “a kind of stan dard that sets out a goal to be
reached, gen er ally an im prove ment in some eco nomic, po -
lit i cal, or so cial fea ture of the com mu nity (though some
goals are neg a tive, in that they stip u late that some pres ent
fea ture is to be pro tected from ad verse change)”;12 and,
“prin ci ple” —strictu sensu— is “a [kind of] stan dard that is
to be ob served, not be cause it will ad vance or se cure an
eco nomic, po lit i cal, or so cial sit u a tion deemed de sir able,
but be cause it is a re quire ment of jus tice or fair ness or
some other di men sion of mo ral ity.”13 Anal o gously, to the
first step, ei ther le gal prin ci ples —lato sensu— are —and
func tion as— pol i cies or not. In the lat ter case, they are
—and func tion as— le gal prin ci ples —strictu sensu—in -
stead. In sum, Le gal prin ci ples —lato sensu— are ei ther
pol i cies or not, i.e. prin ci ples —strictu sensu— and, in other 
words, they are prin ci ples or not, i.e. pol i cies.
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11 Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., p. 22.
12 Idem.
13 Idem.
(3) He ex em pli fies both cases: “Thus the stan dard that
au to mo bile ac ci dents are to be de creased is a pol icy, and
the stan dard that no man may profit by his own wrong a
prin ci ple”.14 The for mer im plies a con tin gent de sir able goal,
whereas the lat ter a nec es sary re quire ment of jus tice, fair -
ness or mo ral ity.
(4) He ac knowl edges that: “The dis tinc tion can be col -
lapsed by con stru ing a prin ci ple as stat ing a so cial goal
(i.e., the goal of so ci ety in which no man prof its by his own
wrong), or by con stru ing a pol icy as stat ing a prin ci ple (i.e.,
the prin ci ple that the goal the pol icy em braces is a wor thy
one) or by adopt ing the util i tar ian the sis that prin ci ples of
jus tice are dis guised state ments of goals (se cur ing the
great est hap pi ness of the great est num ber)”15 Al though,
prima fa cie there is no prob lem if the dis tinc tion be tween
pol i cies and prin ci ples —strictu sensu— is col lapsed fall ing
both into the prin ci ples —lato sensu— cat e gory, he ad mits
that “in some con texts the dis tinc tion has uses which are
lost if it is thus col lapsed”.16
(5) He em pha sizes that his im me di ate pur pose is to “dis -
tin guish prin ci ples in the ge neric sense from rules” and
starts by col lect ing some con crete ex am ples of the for mer,
namely the al ready fa mous cases of Riggs v Palmer,17 also
known as Elmer’s case, in which a New York court had to
de cide whether a heir named in the will of his grand fa ther
could in herit un der that will, even though he had mur dered 
his grand fa ther to claim the in her i tance; and, Henningsen v 
Bloomfield Mo tors, Inc.,18 in which a New Jer sey court had
to de cide whether (or how much) an au to mo bile man u fac -
turer may limit his li a bil ity in case the au to mo bile is de fec -
tive. Both cases were aimed to sug gest that the stan dards
ap plied and quoted in them “are not of the sort we think of
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14 Idem.
15 Ibi dem, pp. 22-23.
16 Ibi dem, p. 23.
17 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
18 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
as le gal rules”.19 In Riggs the court de nied the mur dered a
right to in herit and quoted a vari ant of the Latin ada gio “al -
ter non lædere” (i.e. “do not hurt/wound an other”)20 as the
ap pli ca ble le gal prin ci ple: “No one shall be per mit ted to
profit by his own fraud, or to take ad van tage of his own
wrong, or to found any claim upon his own in iq uity, or to
ac quire prop erty by his own crime”.21 In Henningsen, the
court de nied the man u fac turer a right to limit his li a bil ity
and, at var i ous parts, quoted as ap pli ca ble dif fer ent le gal
prin ci ples, among them “«[I]s there any prin ci ple which is
more fa mil iar or more firmly em bed ded in the his tory of An -
glo-Amer i can law than the ba sic doc trine that the courts
will not per mit them selves to be used as in stru ments of in -
eq uity and in jus tice?»” And “«More spe cif i cally the courts
gen er ally re fuse to lend them selves to the en force ment of a
‘bar gain’ in which one party has un justly taken ad van tage
of the eco nomic ne ces si ties of other…»”.22
(6) He quotes as ex am ples of le gal rules, prop o si tions like 
“The max i mum le gal speed on the turn pike is sixty miles an 
hour” or “A will is in valid un less signed by three wit -
nesses”.23 Let me ad vance that re gard less the fact of be ing
writ ten —or not— into an au thor i ta tive le gal source, an ar -
ti cle in a leg is la tive stat ute or a rul ing in a ju di cial de ci sion, 
and even of us ing the same or sim i lar con cepts and words,
prop o si tions des ig nat ing le gal rules are dif fer ent from those 
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19 Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., pp. 23-24.
20 The Ro man em peror Iustinian em pha sized the ex is tence of three
main le gal prin ci ples con sid ered as “præcepta iuris” (i.e. “le gal pre cepts”):
“honeste vivere” (i.e. “to live re spect fully/truth fully”); “al ter/um non
lædere” (i.e. “to not hurt/wound an other”; and, “ius suum quique tribuere”
(i.e. “to give ev ery one his/her due”).
21 115 N.Y. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190.
22 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d at 86 (quot ing Frank furter, J., in United States 
v Beth le hem Steel, 315 U.S. 289, 326 [1942]).
23 Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., p. 24.
re fer ring to le gal prin ci ples and can be dis tin guish able one
from an other, due not to their form but to their func tion.24
(7) He pro ceeds, fi nally, to sug gest: “The dif fer ence be -
tween le gal prin ci ples and le gal rules is a log i cal dis tinc tion. 
Both sets of stan dards point to par tic u lar de ci sions about
le gal ob li ga tion in par tic u lar cir cum stances, but they dif fer
in the char ac ter of the di rec tion they give”.25 Let me clar ify
that the mean ing of the “char ac ter of the di rec tion they
give” is sim ply the “na ture of the dic tate or di rec tive given”
and so must be un der stood.
In what fol lows, I will try to ex plain suc cinctly, ac cord ing
to Dworkin, the ways in which le gal prin ci ples and le gal
rules do dif fer re gard ing the “na ture of the dic tate or di rec -
tive given”. As he states le gal rules: “are ap pli ca ble in an
all-or-noth ing fash ion. If the facts a rule stip u lates are
given, then ei ther the rule is valid, in which case the an -
swer it sup plies must be ac cepted, or is not, in which case
it con trib utes noth ing to the de ci sion”.26
First of all, in or der to be ap pli ca ble, rules must be valid.
In other words, ei ther a rule is valid or it is not truly a rule, 
i.e. not valid or in valid. Sec ondly, only af ter we have gath -
ered or get to know the rel e vant facts of case, a rule
—which by def i ni tion is valid— is ei ther ap pli ca ble or not to 
the case at hand. In that sense, it ei ther con trib utes to the
de ci sion and hence the an swer sup plied must be ac cepted
and ap plied, or it does not and so must be re jected and not
ap plied with out nec es sar ily ceas ing to be valid. Fur ther -
more, a rule is by def i ni tion valid and must be ap pli ca ble to 
the case at hand if the facts fall within the given dic tate or
di rec tive, but it “may have ex cep tions”.27 In this or der of
ideas
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24 Vid. for ex am ple, Co hen, Fe lix S., “Tran scen den tal Non sense and
the Func tional Ap proach”, Co lum bia Law Re view, Vol. 35, No. 6, 1935, pp. 
809-49.
25 Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., 24.
26 Idem.
27 Idem.
ideas, fol low ing the Latin maxim “Exceptio probat regulam in 
casibus non exceptis”, i.e. “ex cep tion con firms the rule in
the cases not ex cepted”, I will like to sug gest that since the
ex cep tion probes not only the ex is tence of the (gen eral) rule
but also that it is valid and ap pli ca ble to the cases ex -
pected. The fact that ex cep tions are ap pli ca ble to un ex -
pected cases or even to cer tain de vi a tions of the ex pected
cases, some of which might al ready have been ex pected, re -
gard less of be ing made ex plicit or not, does not mean that
the rule is nei ther valid nor ap pli ca ble to ex pected cases
that fall within its realm. Anal o gously, the fact that gen eral
rules are ap pli ca ble to the ex pected cases does not mean
that the ex cep tion is nei ther valid nor ap pli ca ble to un ex -
pected cases or even to cer tain de vi a tions of the ex pected
cases.
Take Dworkin’s ex am ples into ac count: “In base ball a
rule pro vides that if the bat ter has had three strikes, he is
out.”28 In deed, if a bat ter has had three strikes, ac cord ing
to the au thor i ta tive de ci sion of the of fi cial, i.e. um pire, he is 
out. Un less he falls into an ex cep tion to the rule such as
“the bat ter who has taken three strikes is not out if the
catcher drops the third strike”.29 Imag ine that “the bat ter
has had three strikes” and “the catcher drops the third
strike”: in the par tic u lar case at hand, if the bat ter has had 
three strikes as the gen eral rule dic tates, it must be con -
cluded that he is out, but since the catcher dropped the
third strike as the ex cep tion di rects, it must be con cluded
that he is not out, but the rule is still in ef fect: valid and
ap pli ca ble to cases ex pected to fall within its reach (the bat -
ter has had three strikes and the catcher did not drop the
third strike) and not ap pli ca ble to un ex pected cases or to
de vi a tions of the ex pected cases (such as the catcher drop -
ping the third strike).
It is clear not only that both a rule and its ex cep tion are
valid or they truly are nei ther a rule nor an ex cep tion but
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also that they are ap pli ca ble or not in an all-or-noth ing
fash ion: it is ei ther ap pli ca ble or not. How ever, let me ex -
plicit some of the im pli ca tions: first, the rule is ap pli ca ble
or not; sec ond, the ex cep tion is ap pli ca ble or not; third, if
the rule is ap pli ca ble, then the ex cep tion is not ap pli ca ble;
fourth, if the ex cep tion is ap pli ca ble, then the rule is not
ap pli ca ble; fifth, the rule and the ex cep tion can not be ap pli -
ca ble at the same case and time, ei ther the one is ap pli ca -
ble and the other not or both are not ap pli ca ble.30
What’s more, ac cord ing to Dworkin: “If two rules con flict,
one of them can not be a valid rule. The de ci sion as to which 
is valid, and which must be aban doned or re cast, must be
made by ap peal ing to con sid er ations be yond the rules
them selves. A le gal sys tem might reg u late such con flicts by
other rules, which pre fer the rule en acted by the higher au -
thor ity [lex su pe rior], or the rule en acted later [lex pos te rior], 
or the more spe cific rule [lex specificæ], or some thing of
that sort [lex loci, lo cus regit actum]. A le gal sys tem may also 
pre fer the rule sup ported by the more im por tant prin ci ples
[in dubio pro homine/personæ/reo].”31 For this rea son, in
case of con flict be tween two —or more— rules, both rules
can not be or re main valid and ap pli ca ble to the same case,
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30 In the event that both a rule and its ex cep tion(s) are not ap pli ca ble to 
a case at hand, law yers, le gal of fi cials and le gal op er a tors will have to look
for an other le gal stan dard ap pli ca ble, which can be ei ther a rule or not,
i.e. a prin ci ple —lato sensu. The an swer to the ques tion whether they have 
to cre ate a new le gal rule or to ap ply an ex ist ing le gal prin ci ple, as well as
the dis tinc tion be tween strong dis cre tion and weak dis cre tion, will re -
main largely un ex plored at this time. Vid. Hart, H. L. A., The Con cept of
Law, Ox ford, Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1961, p. 124 (there is 2nd ed. with
“Post script”, 1994, p. 127); Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., pp.
31-9 and 68-71; and Waluchow, Wilfrid J., In clu sive Le gal Pos i tiv ism, Ox -
ford, Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1994. Vid. also Flores, Imer B., “H. L. A.
Hart’s Mod er ate In de ter mi nacy The sis Re con sid ered: In Be tween Scylla
and Charybdis?”, Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, No.
5, 2011, pp. 147-73; and Shiner, Roger, “Hart on Ju di cial Dis cre tion”,
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, No. 5, 2011, pp.
341-62.
31 Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., p. 27.
to the ex tent that ei ther one of them most be aban doned or
re for mu lated. In that sense, it is clear that rules are valid
or not in an ab so lute man ner: it is ei ther valid or not (if in -
valid it is not lon ger a rule); but also that rules are ap pli ca -
ble or not in an all-or-noth ing mode: it is ei ther ap pli ca ble
or not (but still a valid rule).
On the con trary, it can be claimed in a sim ple straight -
for ward form that le gal prin ci ples —lato sensu— are sim ply
not le gal rules, but let me try to ex plicit why it is the case
and why they do not func tion alike. First of all, le gal prin ci -
ples’ va lid ity is ab so lute, in the sense that they are al ways
valid and hence can not cease to be valid, as rules do. By
the same to ken, le gal prin ci ples’ ap pli ca bil ity is rel a tive, in
the sense that they are not ap pli ca ble in an all-or-noth ing
fash ion, as rules do. In sum, al though the va lid ity of le gal
prin ci ples is ab so lute, it is their ap pli ca bil ity that is rel a -
tive, i.e. more or less ap pli ca ble, as Dworkin pointed out
they “have a di men sion that rules do not —the di men sion
of weight or im por tance”.32
As a con se quence, of their di men sion of weight, which
grants them value and their va lid ity,33 prin ci ples can not
cease to be valid and do not have ex cep tions as rules do,
but have in stances and coun ter-in stances, which some -
times ap pear as coun ter-prin ci ples, all of which are valu -
able and so al ready valid.34 In Dworkin’s own voice: “We say 
that our law re spects the prin ci ple that no man may profit
from his own wrong, but we do not mean that the law never 
per mits a man to profit from wrongs he com mits. In fact,
peo ple of ten profit, per fectly le gally, from their le gal
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32 Ibi dem, p. 26.
33 The dis tinc tion be tween dif fer ent forms of va lid ity will re main largely 
un ex plored at this time. Vid. Flores, Imer B., “The Quest for
Legisprudence: Constitutionalism v Le gal ism”, in Wintgens, Luc J. (ed.),
The The ory and Prac tice of Leg is la tion: Es says on Legisprudence, Lon don,
Ashgate, 2005, pp. 26-52.
34 On the close re la tion ship be tween prin ci ples and val ues, vid. Alexy,
A The ory of Con sti tu tional Rights, cit., pp. 86-110.
wrongs”.35 Af ter cit ing sev eral coun ter-in stances to the
prin ci ple that “A man may not profit from his own wrong”,
such as ad verse pos ses sion, he adds: “We do not threat
these —and count less other coun ter-in stances that can
eas ily be imag ined— as show ing that the prin ci ple about
prof it ing from one’s wrongs is not a prin ci ple of our le gal
sys tem, or that it is in com plete and needs qual i fy ing ex cep -
tions. We do not treat coun ter-in stances as ex cep tions (at
least not ex cep tions in the way in which a catcher’s drop -
ping the third strike is an ex cep tion) be cause we could not
hope to cap ture these coun ter-in stances sim ply by a more
ex tended state ment of the prin ci ple”.36 It is not as in the
case of le gal rules that the more com plete the state ment of
the rule is the better.
An other con se quence of their weight di men sion is that
prin ci ples do not con flict as rules do and more pre cisely the 
con flict of prin ci ples is not solved as that of rules by ei ther
aban don ing or re cast ing it, since prin ci ples are valu able
and so al ready valid.37 Let me re call, Dworkin as ser tion:
“When prin ci ples in ter sect (the pol icy of pro tect ing au to mo -
bile con sum ers in ter sect ing with prin ci ples of free dom of
con tract, for ex am ple), one who must re solve the con flict
has to take into ac count the rel a tive weight of each. This
can not be, of course, an ex act mea sure ment, and the judg -
ment that a par tic u lar prin ci ple or pol icy is more im por tant 
than an other will of ten be a con tro ver sial one. Nev er the less, 
it is an in te gral part of the con cept of a prin ci ple that it has 
this di men sion that it makes sense to ask how im por tant or 
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36 Idem.
37 Al though some au thors, like Rob ert Alexy, con sider that prin ci ples
can not con flict, but col lide with, com pete with or crash into one an other.
The mer its or de mer its of the dis tinc tion be tween con flict and col li sion,
com pe ti tion or crash will re main un ex plored at this point, and will be use
in ter change ably. Vid. Alexy, A The ory of Con sti tu tional Rights, cit., pp.
50-4.
how weighty it is”.38 Since rules do not have this weight di -
men sion, we can not speak of rules be ing more or less im -
por tant within the sys tem of rules, be cause they are all of
equal im por tance: sub stan tial or pro ce dural, pub lic or pri -
vate, con sti tu tional or crim i nal rules all alike are not only
of equal im por tance but also equally valid. Al though as
Dworkin ad mits “We can speak of rules as be ing func tion -
ally im por tant or un im por tant (the base ball rule that three
strikes are out is more im por tant than the rule that run -
ners may ad vance on a balk, be cause the game would be
much more changed with the first rule al tered than the sec -
ond). In this sense, one le gal rule may be more im por tant
than an other be cause it has a greater or more im por tant
role in reg u lat ing be hav ior. But we can not say that one rule 
is more im por tant than an other within the sys tem of rules,
so that when two rules con flict one su per sedes the other by 
vir tue of its greater weight”.39
Let me try to ex plicit, a cou ple more of con se quences as -
so ci ated with the fact that prin ci ples do have weight and
rules do not.
First, whereas prin ci ples are weighty and more or less
im por tant, rules are not weighty but equally im por tant
since they are valid and are con nected or link to gether in
chains of va lid ity. For a rule to be ap plied it is nec es sary to
be valid and for that pur pose it is suf fi cient to pass a sin gle 
fun da men tal test as so ci ated with rules, i.e. a va lid ity test or 
ped i gree test as Dworkin la beled it, which ba si cally re quires 
an un in ter rupted chain of va lid ity link ing the ap pli ca ble
rule to the more ba sic or fun da men tal ones.40 How ever,
prin ci ples are in ter con nected or hang to gether in a unity of
value (and so of va lid ity) and for a prin ci ple to be ap pli ca -
ble, since by def i ni tion as so ci ated to its weight it does have
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38 Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., pp. 26-7.
39 Ibi dem, p. 27.
40 Ibi dem, p. 17: “rules can be iden ti fied and dis tin guished by spe cific
cri te ria, by tests hav ing to do not with their con tent but with their ped i -
gree or the man ner in which they were adopted or de vel oped”.
value and so it is al ready valid, it is nec es sary to be called
upon and when ever that it is the case, its ap pli ca bil ity is
de cided not on a mere applicative-de duc tive mode but in an 
ar gu men ta tive-in ter pre tive one.41
Sec ond —and more fun da men tally— since rules are
prima fa cie valid and ap pli ca ble when ever the con di tions
pro vided by the gen eral rule are met by the par tic u lar facts
of the case at hand it seems that le gal anal y sis or rea son ing 
can be re duced to an applicative-de duc tive mode, by sub -
sum ing the (par tic u lar) fact(s) into the one and only ap pli -
ca ble (gen eral) rule —or its ex cep tion— from which the le gal 
con se quences fol low log i cally —and al most au to mat i cally or 
me chan i cally. More over, a prin ci ple “does not even pur port
to set out con di tions that make its ap pli ca tion nec es sary.
Rather, it states a rea son that ar gues in one di rec tion, but
does not ne ces si tate a par tic u lar de ci sion”.42 In Dworkin’s
words:43
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41 Dworkin’s Jus tice for Hedge hogs aims not only to at tack value plu -
ral ism and value skep ti cism but also to de fend the unity of value, I will
like to point out that this the sis, i.e. the unity of value the sis, can be
traced all the way back to the early pub li ca tion of “The Model of Rules I” to
the weight di men sion claim, as well as to the fact that prin ci ples are in ter -
con nected and do hang to gether, and has re mained ever since through out 
his later works. Vid. Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., p. 41: “prin ci -
ples rather hang to gether than link to gether [as rules do]”. Vid. also
Dworkin, Ron ald, A Mat ter of Prin ci ple, Cam bridge, Mas sa chu setts, Har -
vard Uni ver sity Press, 1985; Dworkin, Ron ald, Law’s Em pire, Cam bridge,
Mas sa chu setts, Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1986; Dworkin, Ron ald, Free -
dom’s Law. The Moral Read ing of the Amer i can Con sti tu tion, Cam bridge,
Mas sa chu setts, Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1996; Dworkin, Ron ald, Sov er -
eign Vir tue. A The ory and Prac tice of Equal ity, Cam bridge, Mas sa chu setts,
Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2000; Dworkin, Ron ald, Jus tice in Robes, Cam -
bridge, Mas sa chu setts, Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2006; and Dworkin,
Ron ald, Jus tice for Hedge hogs, Cam bridge, Mas sa chu setts, Har vard Uni -
ver sity Press, 2011.
42 Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, cit., p. 26.
43 Idem.
There may be other prin ci ples or pol i cies ar gu ing in the
other di rec tion... If so, our prin ci ple may not pre vail, but
that does not mean that it is not a prin ci ple of our le gal sys -
tem, be cause in the next case, when these con tra ven ing con -
sid er ations are ab sent or less weighty, the prin ci ple may be
de ci sive. All that is meant, when we say that a par tic u lar
prin ci ple is a prin ci ple of our law, is that the prin ci ple is one
which of fi cials must take into ac count, if it is rel e vant, as a
con sid er ation in clin ing in one di rec tion or an other.
In that sense, rules are con clu sive in an all-or-noth ing
fash ion. They are ap pli ca ble or not; and, in the event of a
con flict, they are aban doned or re for mu lated, in or der to
be come a new gen eral rule or an ex cep tion to one. But —as
Dworkin sug gests— “Prin ci ples do not work that way; they
in cline a de ci sion one way, though not con clu sively, and
they sur vive in tact when they do not pre vail.”44 Since prin -
ci ples are rel a tive or non-con clu sive and do have (more or
less) weight and coun ter-weight it is clear that le gal anal y -
sis or rea son ing —in the case of le gal prin ci ples— can not
be re duced to a mere applicative-de duc tive mode, but to an
ar gu men ta tive-in ter pre ta tive mode char ac ter ized by bal anc -
ing the dif fer ent prin ci ples and coun ter-prin ci ples at stake
—or their weight and coun ter-weight.
In sum, re gard ing ap pli ca bil ity, rules are ab so lute or con -
clu sive and ap plied in an all-or-noth ing fash ion, whereas
prin ci ples are rel a tive or non-con clu sive and more or less
ap pli ca ble or rel e vant due to its di men sion of weight —and
coun ter-weight. Hence, prin ci ples do not ad mit or have ex -
cep tions but in stances —and coun ter-in stances— point ing
in one di rec tion or an other and when ever they ap pear to be
in con flict —or in com pe ti tion, col li sion or crashing— since
they can not be aban doned or re for mu lated and much less
over ruled, a form of “bal anc ing” co mes and must come into
play to work it out.
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In that sense, Rob ert Alexy ar gues: “The na ture of prin ci -
ples im plies the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity and vice
versa”.45 In ad di tion, he clar i fied: “That the na ture of prin ci -
ples im plies the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity means that the
prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity with its three sub-prin ci ples of
suit abil ity, ne ces sity (use of the least in tru sive means), and
pro por tion al ity in its nar row sense (that is, the bal anc ing
re quire ment) log i cally fol lows from the na ture of prin ci ples;
it can be de duced from them”.46 And, fi nally, cited the Ger -
man Fed eral Con sti tu tional Court as stat ing that “the prin -
ci ple of pro por tion al ity emerges ‘ba si cally from the na ture of 
con sti tu tional rights them selves’.”47
Let me em pha size that the bal anc ing test is iden ti fied
with a prin ci ple it self, i.e. the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity
—lato sensu. It is a prin ci ple that can be im plied by the very 
same na ture of prin ci ples and as such con sti tutes a prin ci -
ple of prin ci ples for at least two rea sons. First, it pro vides a
means to con trol the (strong) dis cre tion of law yers, le gal of -
fi cials, and op er a tors as so ci ated with the cases in which
ap par ently the rules have run out and the only op tion at
the point of their ap pli ca tion is ei ther to cre ate a new rule
or to re cast the ex ist ing one to fit the case at hand, with the 
cor re spond ing vi o la tion of le gal prin ci ples such as le gal cer -
tainty and se cu rity, le gal ity and normativity, so on and so
forth. Sec ond, it also pro vides a means to di rect the ac tiv ity 
of a leg is la tive au thor ity, re gard less of its name and na ture, 
es pe cially in com plex mod ern so ci et ies char ac ter ized by the 
cre ation —or rec og ni tion— of le gal stan dards other than
rules such as prin ci ples and pol i cies into the le gal sys tem,
which most prob a bly will con flict. Please con sider the pos -
si bil ity of le gal au thor i ties not only hav ing to re al ize cer tain
prin ci ples in the form of both rights and pol i cies but also
hav ing to rec og nize cer tain lim its to such rights and pol i -
cies. Those lim i ta tions and re stric tions must be le git i mate
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47 Idem. Vid. BVerfGE 19, 342 (348 f.); 65, 1 (44).
and as such jus ti fi able and rea son able to stand a chal lenge 
on their con sti tu tion al ity, and a hint on whether they will
be up held or not can be found in the prin ci ple of pro por -
tion al ity it self. In short, let me ad vance the the sis of pro -
por tion al ity as a prin ci ple of prin ci ples for both leg is la tion
and ad ju di ca tion, es pe cially on con sti tu tional and hu man
rights in ter pre ta tion, as we will see in the fol low ing part.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
       AND HUMAN RIGHTS INTERPRETATION
As we have al ready seen, in Ger many, the Ger man Fed -
eral Con sti tu tional Court has rec og nized not only the ex is -
tence of the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity but also the fact
that it emerges from the na ture of con sti tu tional (and hu -
man) rights them selves, de spite lack ing an ex press for mu -
la tion. Anal o gously, in Can ada, the prin ci ple of pro por tion -
al ity emerged from the de ci sion of the Ca na dian Su preme
Court in R. v Oakes48 and has been de vel oped fur ther in fol -
low ing de ci sions, to the ex tent that its in flu ence can be
traced not only in New Zea land, South Af rica, Is rael, Zim -
ba bwe and the United King dom but also in the Eu ro pean
Court of Hu man Rights and in the Inter-Amer i can Court of
Hu man Rights.49 Ac tu ally, it can be said that the Oakes
test has been in flu enced by them as well to the ex tent that
it has to be mea sured against three sub-cri te ria: the means 
used to limit the right must be ra tio nally con nected to the
ob jec tive sought; the right must be im paired as lit tle as
pos si ble to achieve the ob jec tive; and fi nally there must be
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48 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
49 For the mi gra tion of con sti tu tional ideas, in gen eral, vid. for ex am -
ple, Sujit Choudhry (ed.), The Mi gra tion of Con sti tu tional Ideas, Cam -
bridge, Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2006; and, for the prin ci ple of pro -
por tion al ity, in par tic u lar, vid. Deschamps, Ma rie, The Cross-Fer ti li sa tion
of Ju ris pru dence and the Prin ci ple of Pro por tion al ity. Pro cess and Re sult
from a Ca na dian Per spec tive (on file with the au thor).
pro por tion al ity be tween the ef fect of the lim i ta tion upon the 
right and the ob jec tive achieved by that lim i ta tion.50
Sim i larly, to Can ada and Ger many,51 the prin ci ple of pro -
por tion al ity ap peared in Mex ico ex plic itly for the first time
in the dis sent ing opin ion of a mi nor ity of four out of nine
jus tices of the Mex i can Su preme Court that de cided in April 
20, 2004 the Amparo en Revisión 543/2003 on whether the
dis tinc tion in tro duced by the leg is la tive in the ar ti cle 68 of
the Ley Gen eral de Población (i.e. a gen eral bill reg u lat ing
not only mi gra tion but also na tion al ity and for eign sta tus)
was con sti tu tional or not by re quir ing an “au tho ri za tion”
from the mi gra tion au thor ity when ever a na tional in tended
to marry a for eigner in the Mex i can soil on the ground of
be ing dis crim i na tory and as such an un equal treat ment
against the third para graph of ar ti cle 1 of the fed eral Con -
sti tu tion, which pro hib its dis crim i na tion.52 The ar gu ment
at the core of the dis sent ing opin ion runs as fol low:
Thus it is nec es sary to de ter mine, first of all, whether the
dis tinc tion in tro duced by the leg is la tive fol lows an ob jec tive
and con sti tu tion ally valid pur pose. It is clear that the leg is la -
tor can not in tro duce un equal treat ments in an ar bi trary
fash ion, but must do it with the pur pose of ad vanc ing the
consecution of con sti tu tion ally valid ob jec tives, that is ad -
mis si ble within the bound ary lim its of the con sti tu tional pro -
vi sions, or ex pressly in cluded in such pro vi sions.
In sec ond place, it is nec es sary to ex am ine the ra tio nal ity
or ad e quacy of the dis tinc tion in tro duced by the leg is la tor. It
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main largely un ex plored at this time, vid. for ex am ple, Di eter Grimm,
“Pro por tion al ity in Ca na dian and Ger man Ju ris pru dence”, Uni ver sity of
To ronto Law Jour nal, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2007, pp. 383-97.
52 Vid. Flores, Imer B., “Igualdad, no discriminación (y políticas
públicas): A propósito de la constitucionalidad o no del artículo 68 de la
Ley Gen eral de Población”, in Torre Martínez, Carlos de la (ed.), El derecho 
a la no discriminación, México, UNAM, 2006, pp. 263-306. Vid. also
Aguirre Anguiano, Sergio Sal va dor et al., “Igualdad y discriminación en
Mex ico. Un análisis constitucional”, Este país, No. 163, 2004, pp. 36-44.
is nec es sary that the in tro duc tion of the dis tinc tion con sti -
tutes an apt means to con duce to the end or ob jec tive that
the leg is la tor wants to achieve. If the re la tion of in stru men -
tal ity be tween the classi fi ca tory mea sure in tro duced by the
leg is la tor and the end pre tended to be achieved is not clear,
or the con clu sion reached is that the mea sure is sim ply in ef -
fi ca cious to con duct to the pre tended end, it will be oblig a -
tory to con clude that the mea sure is not con sti tu tion ally rea -
son able.
Thirdly, the req ui site of pro por tion ally of the leg is la tive
mea sure must be met: the leg is la tor can not try to achieve
con sti tu tion ally le git i mate ob jec tives in an openly dis pro por -
tion ate way, but must guar an tee an ad e quate bal ance be -
tween the un equal treat ment granted and the pur pose fol -
lowed. It is of course be yond the com pe tence of the Su preme 
Court the duty to ex am ine in the ex er cise of its func tions,
the ap pre ci a tion on whether the dis tinc tion re al ized by the
leg is la tor is the more op ti mal and op por tune mea sure to
reach the de sired end; that will re quire ap ply ing cri te rion of
po lit i cal op por tu nity that is to tally out of the ju ris dic tional
com pe tence of the court. Such com pe tence is lim ited to de -
ter mine whether the dis tinc tion re al ized by the leg is la tor is
within the spec trum of treat ments that may be con sider pro -
por tional to the fact sit u a tion at stake, the pur pose of the
law, the rights af fected by it, with in de pend ence that, form
cer tain points of view, one may be con sider to be pref er a ble
to oth ers. What the con sti tu tional guar an tee of equal ity re -
quires is that, in de fin i tive, the achieve ment of a con sti tu -
tion ally valid ob jec tive is not made to the cost of an un nec es -
sary or un lim ited af fec ta tion of other con sti tu tion ally pro-
tected rights.
Ac cord ing to the mi nor ity the tri ple cri te rion of ob jec tiv -
ity, ra tio nal ity and pro por tion al ity was not met and there -
fore the leg is la tive act must have been ruled un con sti tu -
tional in stead.53 It is also worth to men tion that pre vi ously
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53 In my opin ion, the cri te ria were met. How ever, the im por tance of the
case does not rely on the rul ing it self but in the rec og ni tion of the prin ci -
ple of pro por tion al ity.
to this de ci sion, in Sep tem ber 17, 2003 the Inter-Amer i can
Court of Hu man Rights in its Con sult ing Opin ion 18/03 on
the le gal con di tion and rights of un doc u mented im mi grants 
ar gued that dis tinc tions grant ing a dif fer en ti ated treat ment
are not pro hib ited per se, and that such dis tinc tions must
be jus ti fied or le git i mated, when ever ad mis si ble and rel e -
vant, in vir tue of meet ing the cri te ria of be ing ob jec tive, ra -
tio nal and pro por tional.54
Re gard less of the dif fer ences be tween the Ca na dian, Ger -
man and Mex i can —via Inter-Amer i can Court of Hu man
Rights— ap proaches, the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity —lato
sensu— and its sub-cri te rion of pro por tion al ity —strict
sensu, i.e. there must be a nec es sary bal ance or pro por tion
be tween the lim i ta tion of a right and the ob jec tive achieved
by such lim i ta tion, is now a days gen er ally pres ent all over
the board. What’s more in the United States of Amer ica,
where the dif fer ent lev els of scru tiny ap proach —ra tio nal
ba sis scru tiny, in ter me di ate scru tiny and strict scru tiny—
is em ployed de pend ing on the in ter est at stake and how
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     Since the mi nor ity is care ful in jus ti fy ing its de ci sion as within its ju di -
cial com pe tence and not as an in va sion or usur pa tion of the leg is la tive
one, I will like to seize the op por tu nity to in tro duce a dis tinc tion be tween
two types of ju di cial ac tiv ism: (1) in ter pre ta tive, and (2) in ven tive —or leg -
is la tive. The first is ad mis si ble and thus must be en cour aged as a form of
a proper ju di cial func tion; and, the sec ond is not ad mis si ble and so must
be dis cour age as a form of an im proper ju di cial in va sion or usur pa tion of
the leg is la tive func tion. Vid. Flores, Imer B., “Legisprudence: The Forms
and Lim its of Leg is la tion”, Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del
Derecho, No. 1, 2007, pp. 247, 257-260; and Flores, Imer B.,
“Legisprudence: The Role and Ra tio nal ity of Leg is la tors —vis-à-vis
Judges— to wards the Re al iza tion of Jus tice”, Mex i can Law Re view, Vol. 1,
No. 2, 2009, pp. 91, 100-106. Vid. also Dworkin, Law’s Em pire, cit., p. 66:
“The jus ti fi ca tion need not fit ev ery as pect or fea ture of the stand ing prac -
tice, but it must fit enough for the in ter preter to be able to see him self as
in ter pret ing that prac tice, not in vent ing a new one.” Dworkin, Jus tice in
Robes, cit., p. 15: “Any law yer has built up, through ed u ca tion, train ing,
and ex pe ri ence, his own sense of when an in ter pre ta tion fits well enough
to count as an in ter pre ta tion rather than as an in ven tion”.
54 CO-18/03 (2003), para graph 84.
“fun da men tal” the right in ques tion is con sid ered to be. It
has been ar gued by jus tice Ste phen Breyer, in his dis sent
in the Su preme Court’s de ci sion in Dis trict of Co lum bia v.
Heller,55 that pro por tion al ity was the pref er a ble ap proach to 
scru ti niz ing leg is la tion lim it ing the Sec ond Amend ment
right to bear arms and he even noted that the pro por tion al -
ity ap proach has been “ap plied… in var i ous con sti tu tional
con texts, in clud ing elec tion law cases, speech cases, and
due pro cess cases”.56 In that sense, jus tice Breyer is not
only ad vo cat ing for ex tend ing the bal anc ing of the in ter me -
di ate scru tiny —which has a strik ing re sem blance with the
pro por tion al ity ap proach— to strict scru tiny cases but also
ar gu ing for mak ing it the cen tral method for the pro tec tion
of rights and the jus ti fi ca tion of its lim i ta tions, in the
United States.57
Fi nally, let me turn back to the Mex i can cases. Firstly, to
a case that re in forces the ad e quacy of pro por tion al ity ap -
proach —or in ter me di ate scru tiny— over the strict scru tiny
in con sti tu tional rights ad ju di ca tion and in ter pre ta tion;
and, sec ondly, to a se ries of con tro ver sial leg is la tive re -
forms, which have al ready stand the chal lenge of its con sti -
tu tion al ity, due to the fact that they were drafted and en -
acted con sid er ing the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity by means
of com par a tive le gal in ter pre ta tion of lo cal or na tional
courts and re gional or in ter na tional tri bu nals all over the
globe.
On the one hand, in Oc to ber 5, 2005, the First Cham ber
of the Mex i can Su preme Court de cided —by a ma jor ity of
three out of five jus tices— the con tro ver sial Amparo en
Revisión 2676/2003, well known as Caso Bandera (i.e. Flag
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55 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
56 Idem. at 2851.
57 The re la tion ship be tween the Amer i can bal anc ing and the Ger man
pro por tion al ity will re main large un ex plored at this time. Vid. for ex am -
ple, Co hen-Eliya, Moshe and Porat, Iddo, “Amer i can Bal anc ing and Ger -
man Pro por tion al ity: The His tor i cal Or i gins”, In ter na tional Jour nal of Con -
sti tu tional Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2010, pp. 263-86.
Case) or Caso del Poeta Maldito (i.e. Wicked Poet Case). To
make a long story short: A poet, i.e. Sergio Hernán Witz Ro -
dri guez, who was charged with the fed eral crime of “ultraje
a los símbolos patrios” (i.e. out rag ing the na tional sym bols),
by writ ing a poem in which he used the word “bandera” (i.e.
flag), and said dis gust ing and of fen sive things —not nec es -
sar ily dis re spect ful but crit i cal from my point of view— pe ti -
tioned the fed eral au thor ity for an Amparo, by chal leng ing
the con sti tu tion al ity of the ar ti cle 191 of the Código Pe nal
Fed eral (i.e. Fed eral Crim i nal Code), on the ba sis of the fed -
eral Con sti tu tion guar an tee on ar ti cle 6 to pro tect free dom
of speech as long as it does not con sti tute an “at tack to
mor als, [or] third-party rights, in cite a crime, or dis turb the 
pub lic or der”.
Since the Con sti tu tion con tem plated ex plic itly cer tain
lim its to the free dom of speech, the ma jor ity merely sub -
sumed the dis gust ing and of fen sive —for them even dis re -
spect ful— ref er ence in a poem to a na tional sym bol as an
at tack to the mor als of the com mu nity, and de nied the
Amparo con sid er ing it a le git i mate con sti tu tional lim i ta tion. 
On the con trary, with the pro por tion al ity ap proach, the
Court must have to care fully an a lyze whether it was pro -
por tional to criminalize the dis gust ing and of fen sive ref er -
ence in a poem —or any other form of speech— to a na -
tional sym bol such as the flag when it is done in an
ar gu ably dis re spect ful way, or it was re quired that such ref -
er ence in deed at tacked the mor als or third-party rights, in -
cited a crime, or dis turbed the pub lic or der.
In the dis sent ing opin ion, the mi nor ity starts by quot ing
the Con sult ing Opin ion 5/85 of the Inter-Amer i can Court of 
Hu man Rights, dated No vem ber 13, 1985, to es tab lish a di -
rect link be tween the free dom of speech and a dem o cratic
so ci ety, and con tin ues by stress ing that the right to a free -
dom of ex pres sion is not merely a right to speech but a
right to a free speech: “The free dom of ex pres sion, in other
words, pro tects the in di vid ual not only in the man i fes ta tion 
of the ideas shared with the great ma jor ity of the fel low cit i -
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zens, but also of un pop u lar, [and] pro voc a tive ideas or,
even, those that cer tain sec tors of the cit i zenry con sider of -
fen sive.” Fur ther more, con tin ues “Any leg is la tive act con -
tain ing a lim i ta tion to the rights of free speech and press,
with the in ten tion of concretizing the con sti tu tional lim its
fore seen must, there fore, thor oughly re spect the req ui site
that such con cre tion is nec es sary, pro por tional and of
course com pat i ble with the con sti tu tional prin ci ples, val ues 
and rights.” In ad di tion, con sid ers that the leg is la tive ac tion 
criminalizing speech-mak ing ref er ence to the na tional flag
“goes well be yond any rea son able un der stand ing of what
can be es ti mated to be cov ered by the ne ces sity of pre serv -
ing the pub lic mo ral ity. A crime so con ceived af fects di rectly 
the nu cleus pro tected by the free dom of speech, which con -
tains, as has been pointed out be fore, the free dom to ex -
press freely con vic tions in any mat ter, and in a spe cial way
in po lit i cal mat ter”. What’s more con cludes not only that it
in cludes a dis pro por tional ef fect:
The ef fect of the ar ti cle un der exam is to com pel the in di vid -
u als not to dis pute, in any event, cer tain po lit i cal con vic -
tions, and not sim ply to se cure the pro tec tion of the nu cleus
of moral con vic tions about right and wrong, ba sic and fun -
da men tal, of a so ci ety, mak ing nu ga tory the fun da men tal
right to a free ex pres sion and the ba sis of po lit i cal plu ral ism
that our Con sti tu tion guar an tees at the most higher level.
But also that there are other less in tru sive means to pur -
sue the le git i mate con cern of pro mot ing na tion al ism and re -
spect for the na tional sym bols such as the flag:
What the State can do via ed u ca tion, can not be done
through a more vir u lent and del i cate in stru ment —crim i nal
law— when is di rected, be sides, not to groups that have with 
the State a spe cial re la tion of sub or di na tion (such as mil i -
tary or pub lic civil func tion ar ies) but to the com mon cit i zen,
and what is at stake is pre serv ing some kind of mean ing to
the con sti tu tional fun da men tal rights to ex press and pub lish 
writ ings in a free way.
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In sum, the mi nor ity con cludes:
Hence, we are against the de ci sion sup ported by the ma jor -
ity. What did cor re spond to de ter mine as First Cham ber of
the Su preme Court, we can not for get, is not whether mis ter
Witz wrote a good or bad poem, or whether we will say about 
the na tional flag the same as he. What did com peted us to
de ter mine is what a per son has a right to say in Mex ico with -
out suf fer ing a crim i nal pros e cu tion that marks he/she for
life and that may take him/her into jail. What did cor re -
spond to us, in de fin i tive, was to guar an tee the scope for the
pro tec tion of a fun da men tal right and to is sue a res o lu tion
that gives plenty prac ti cal op er a tion to what our Con sti tu -
tion es tab lishes, grant ing plenty op er a tion to the civil rights
of the cit i zens, el e ment over which the con struc tion of the
de moc racy our Con sti tu tion fore sees must be built. That did
ob li gated us to pro tect the pe ti tioner against ar ti cle 191 of
the Fed eral Crim i nal Code, as an im per a tive mea sure to
safe guard the nu cleus of his/her right to ex press freely in
our coun try, and to di vulge his/her own ideas through the
pub li ca tion of writ ings.
Pro tect ing the pe ti tioner in this case nei ther does im ply
—is im por tant to stress it out— to do a gen eral dec la ra tion of 
un con sti tu tion al ity of the ar ti cle 191 of the Fed eral Crim i nal
Code, nor a de fin i tive ex pul sion from the le gal or der ing. As it 
is proper from the writ of amparo in our le gal sys tem, which
does not ex er cise a ju di cial re view of leg is la tion with erga
omnes ef fects, but inter par tes, that is, to the con crete case
and not in an ab stract way, the crime of out rag ing the na -
tional sym bols will re main in the Crim i nal Code and may
con sti tute the pa ram e ter to crim i nally per se cute con ducts so 
de serv ing. In a case such as the one de bated, in which what
is at stake is the pres er va tion of the es sen tial con tent of the
free dom of ex pres sion (since writ ing po ems is per haps the
more clas sic and less chal lenged man i fes ta tion of such lib -
erty), the re spect to the con sti tu tional or der ob li gated this
Cham ber to de clare it in ap pli ca ble, be cause the sim ple fact
that leav ing open the door to a judge who may use it to con -
sider crim i nally the con duct of mis ter Witz im plies le git i mat -
ing a vi o la tion to his more ba sic lib er ties.
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De spite the ma jor ity rul ing, there is a clear par al lel be -
tween this case and the United States of Amer ica Su preme
Court’s flag-burn ing cases of Texas v John son58 strik ing
down a con vic tion un der Texas flag-burn ing lo cal stat ute;
and United States v Eichman59 strik ing down a fed eral stat -
ute that im posed crim i nal sanc tions on some one who
“know ingly mu ti lates, de faces, phys i cally de files, burns,
main tains on the floor or ground, or tram ples upon any flag 
of the United States”.
In the for mer, Jus tice An thony Ken nedy in a con cur ring
opin ion noted:60
The hard fact is that some times we must make de ci sions we
do not like. We make them be cause they are right, right in
the sense that the law and the Con sti tu tion, as we see them, 
com pel the re sult. And so great is our com mit ment to the
pro cess that, ex cept in the rare case, we do not pause to ex -
press dis taste for the re sult, per haps for fear of un der min ing 
a val ued prin ci ple that dic tates the de ci sion.
In the lat ter, the Su preme Court noted that pro tec tion for 
“ex pres sion of dis sat is fac tion with the pol i cies of this coun -
try [is] sit u ated at the core of our First Amend ment val -
ues”.61
On the other hand, the Leg is la tive As sem bly of Mex ico
City has en acted in the re cent past some con tro ver sial leg -
is la tive re forms: (1) al low ing the in ter rup tion of a preg nancy 
in the first twelve weeks, i.e. a first tri mes ter abor tion, fol -
low ing the well-know Roe v Wade62 three-tri mes ter tri ple
cri te ria; and (2) al low ing gay-mar riages and rec og niz ing
their right to adop tion, af ter al low ing civil un ions, un der
the la bel of sociedades de convivencia (i.e. cohabitating so -
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58 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
59 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
60 Texas v. John son, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989) (Ken nedy, J., con -
cur ring).
61 United States v Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2407 (1990).
62 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
ci et ies), and re sis tance by ad min is tra tive le gal of fi cials to
grant them the right to adop tion. Be sides, it is ac tu ally dis -
cuss ing the ne ces sity of (3) reg u lat ing the pos si bil ity of
uterus’ surrogating at the lo cal level, but is also an a lyz ing
the pos si bil ity of pre sent ing an ini tia tive at the fed eral level.
Both (1) and (2) have al ready be ing con sti tu tion ally chal -
lenged and did stand such chal lenge. On one side, a propos 
of (1) the Mex i can Su preme Court de cided the Acciones de
Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 and 147/2007 with a ma jor -
ity of eight out of eleven jus tices in Au gust 28, 2008. As the 
Chief Jus tice —who by the by was in the mi nor ity— clar i -
fied in a speech com mu ni cat ing the de ci sion to the so ci ety:
The res o lu tion of the Su preme Court of Jus tice of the Na tion
nei ther criminalizes nor de crim i nal izes abor tion.
It is nei ther an at tri bu tion of this Con sti tu tional Tri bu nal
to es tab lish crimes nor sanc tions.
We did de ter mine the con sti tu tion al ity of a norm ap proved 
by the rep re sen ta tive body, and in this par tic u lar case, did
par tic i pated in a def i ni tion of na tional tran scen dence.
Among the rea sons to up hold the leg is la tive re forms was
mainly the con sid er ation that the hu man life pro tected im -
plic itly by the Mex i can Con sti tu tion and ex plic itly by the
Amer i can Con ven tion on Hu man Rights, stated that the
pro tec tion of life starts with the con cep tion, in gen eral, and
hence that as an ex cep tion it could be stip u lated dif fer ently
by state par ties. In this case, un til af ter the first twelve
weeks pe riod of a preg nancy and by giv ing pro por tional pri -
or ity to sev eral other com pet ing rights at stake, such as the 
hu man life of the women seek ing an abor tion and her right
to health which will be im paired if she has to prac tice a
dan ger ous and un safe clan des tine (il le gal) abor tion pro ce -
dure; her free dom to choose whether to carry a preg nancy
to term or not; and —in my opin ion— to some ex tent a right 
to (her) pri vacy. In ad di tion, the tran scen dence of the de ci -
sion and its le gal and so cial ef fects is out of ques tion.
What’s more sparked also in the lo cal-state level the en act -
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ment of at least 17 anti-abor tion state con sti tu tional re -
forms and/or stat utes, some of them with a du bi ous con sti -
tu tion al ity.
On the other, as re gards of (2) the Mex i can Su preme
Court started to dis cuss the Acción de Inconstitucionalidad
2/2010 in Au gust 3, 2010. In the fol low ing ses sions of Au -
gust 5, 10 and 16 re solved: first, with a ma jor ity of eight
out of ten jus tices, the con sti tu tion al ity of the same-sex
mar riage; sec ond, with a ma jor ity of nine out of eleven jus -
tices, the rec og ni tion of its ef fects in all the coun try; and,
third, also with a ma jor ity of nine out of eleven jus tices, the 
con sti tu tion al ity of their right to an adop tion.
In short, the Leg is la tive As sem bly of Mex ico City, first,
de cided to rec og nize the so-called civil un ions, un der the la -
bel of sociedades de convivencia, as not do ing it will have a
dis pro por tion ate ef fect on de facto un ions of gays and les bi -
ans by de ny ing ei ther le gal rights or le gal ob li ga tions to
their ho mo sex ual part ners, which het ero sex u als do en joy or 
have. And, later, faced with the fact that ad min is tra tive le -
gal of fi cials re fused to grant same-sex cou ples the right to
adopt, re solved not only to mod ify the la bel to the full-bod -
ied same-sex mar riage but also to ex plic itly rec og nize their
right to adopt, be cause not do ing so will also have a dis pro -
por tion ate ef fect on ho mo sex u als by de ny ing a right that
het ero sex u als do en joy. In that sense, Mex ico City leg is la -
tors rec og nized twice the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity as a
guide line for the use of its leg is la tive power. Ac tu ally, if the
ac tion of ad min is tra tive le gal of fi cials re fus ing to grant
same-sex cou ples the right to adopt were to be con sti tu tion -
ally chal lenged, the Su preme Court of Mex ico most prob a -
bly would find it to have a dis pro por tion ate ef fect and so to
be un con sti tu tional by vi o lat ing the prin ci ple of propor-
tionality.
IV. CON CLU SION
Fi nally, to con clude, let me re in force the ad e quacy of the
bal anc ing or pro por tion al ity test, as well as of the the sis of
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pro por tion al ity as a prin ci ple of prin ci ples for both leg is la -
tion and ad ju di ca tion, es pe cially on con sti tu tional and hu -
man rights in ter pre ta tion, by point ing out its close re la tion -
ship with John Rawls’ dif fer ence prin ci ple.63 As it is
well-know, the dif fer ence prin ci ple is one of the most com -
mon and pop u lar instantiations of the prin ci ple of pro por -
tion al ity, in which a lim i ta tion or re stric tion on any right,
say lib erty or equal ity, must be pro por tional, in or der to be
jus ti fied or le git i mated, such as in the case of per mit ting
dif fer ences as long as they are in ben e fit of the less-ad van -
taged or worse-off mem bers of so ci ety, such as those con -
tem plated in some af fir ma tive ac tion pro grams. None the -
less, it must be pro vided that they do not deny the
ex is tence and ex er cise of a le gal prin ci ple or right be cause
the lim i ta tions and re stric tions are and must re main pro -
por tional, grant ing to the prin ci ple of pro por tion al ity its
prin ci ple of prin ci ples con sti tu tion.
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63 Vid. Rawls, A The ory of Jus tice, cit., pp. 75-83.
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